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If  God is entirely good (omnibenevolent) and all-powerful (omnipotent), why 
is there evil in the world that he created? Whereas some thinkers resolve this 
perceived dilemma by denying either God’s omnipotence or omnibenevolence, 
many theologians who affirm both of  these divine characteristics appeal to the 
free-will defense. This perspective claims that, although God is entirely good 
and possesses the power to exclude evil altogether, God allows evil because to 
do otherwise would negate creaturely free will. However, theologians continue 
to vigorously debate whether Scripture supports the freedom of  humans to 
will otherwise than they do. Whereas the indeterminist appeals to passages 
that support the freedom of  humans, the determinist responds by asserting 
that human “freedom” is compatible with unilateral divine determination of  
all events (compatibilism). With this impasse in mind, this essay addresses 
the issue of  whether Scripture actually supports free will by appealing to the 
logically prior and theocentric question: Does God always get what he wants?
The Debate over Human Freedom in Scripture
Does Scripture support the freedom of  humans? This heavily debated and 
age-old question over the relationship between divine providence and human 
freedom has eluded consensus throughout the ages of  Christian theology. 
Over time, the argument has become increasingly complex, with competing 
conceptions of  what “free will” means. The two most prominent conceptions 
of  human free will stem from the mutually exclusive conceptions of  
determinism and indeterminism, which lie at the crux of  this issue. Determinists 
contend that God unilaterally and arbitrarily determines every occurrence 
such that creatures cannot will otherwise than they do. Nevertheless, many 
determinists contend that humans do indeed possess free will. In this view of  
soft determinism, known as compatibilism, free will means that a creature is 
not externally compelled but is nevertheless controlled by God’s unilaterally 
efficacious will. In other words, the compatibilist contends that humans are 
free to do what they want but what they want is itself  unilaterally determined 
by God.1 Indeterminists, on the other hand, believe that the human will is not 
1There are many varieties of  compatibilism, and this description refers to what is 
sometimes referred to as broad compatibilism—that is, the view that determinism is 
compatible with free will and moral responsibility. Some compatibilists favor a narrow 
compatibilism (e.g., semicompatibilism) wherein agents may be determined such that 
they lack free will but nevertheless possess moral responsibility. On the various forms 
and contemporary issues regarding compatibilism, see the essays in Robert Kane, ed. 
The Oxford Handbook of  Free Will, 2d ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 
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(entirely) determined by divine or other causes. Accordingly, humans have the 
freedom to choose otherwise than they do.2 That is, they possess libertarian 
and significant freedom.3
The crux of  the debate between compatibilists and libertarians, then, 
depends on whether God unilaterally determines the outcome of  all events. 
Can creatures will otherwise than they do, as many libertarians affirm, or does 
God arbitrarily and unilaterally determine all occurrences such that creatures 
only do what God has eternally determined? For many scholars, the outcome 
of  this debate hinges upon Scriptural support. However, many determinists 
and indeterminists claim biblical support for their positions while denying 
that the opposite position does justice to the biblical data.4
153-242.
2Some libertarians define human free will in a way that does not require the 
freedom to do otherwise. On one such view (source incompatibilism), alternate 
possibility is not required for freedom but merely “the absence of  external causal 
constraints determining one’s action.” William Lane Craig, “Response to Boyd,” in 
Four Views on Divine Providence, ed. Dennis Jowers (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 
2011), 226. This view that alternate possibility is not a necessary condition of  genuine 
freedom accepts the upshot of  Frankfurt-type examples that aim to demonstrate that 
the ability to do otherwise is not a necessary condition of  moral responsibility. Since 
Harry Frankfurt’s seminal article (“Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility,” 
Journal of  Philosophy 66/23 [1969]: 829-839) such examples have been the subject of  
ongoing debate. See the various positions explained in David Widerker and Michael 
McKenna, eds., Moral Responsibility and Alternative Possibilities: Essays on the Importance of  
Alternative Possibilities (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2003); Robert Kane, ed. The Oxford 
Handbook of  Free Will, 243-308. I am among those not convinced that Frankfurt-type 
examples successfully refute the principle of  alternate possibility (PAP). See, for one 
example of  the philosophical defense of  PAP, Carl Ginet, “In Defense of  the Principle 
of  Alternative Possibilities: Why I Don’t Find Frankfurt’s Argument Convincing,” 
in Moral Responsibility and Alternative Possibilities: Essays on the Importance of  Alternative 
Possibilities, ed. David Widerker and Michael McKenna (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 
2003), 53-74. Nevertheless, the conclusion of  this essay does not hinge upon the 
PAP version of  libertarian free will. A slightly more modest definition of  creaturely 
libertarian freedom is sufficient, flowing from the fact of  divine unfulfilled desires 
in Scripture, which suggest that creatures possess (at least) the freedom to choose 
otherwise than God desires.
3Significant freedom affirms, yet goes beyond, libertarian freedom by explicitly 
framing human freedom as moral freedom. See Alvin Plantinga, God, Freedom, and Evil 
(Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1977), 30, 47; Alvin Plantinga, The Nature of  Necessity 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1974), 166-167.
4I firmly agree with John Piper that this decision should be made only “on the 
basis of  what the Scriptures teach.” John Piper, “Are There Two Wills in God?” in 
Still Sovereign: Contemporary Perspectives on Election, Foreknowledge, and Grace, ed. Thomas 
R. Schreiner and Bruce A. Ware (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Book House, 2000), 130. 
Cf. Piper’s expansion of  this essay in his brief  book, Does God Desire All to Be Saved? 
(Wheaton, IL: Crossway, 2013).
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The indeterminist who supports the significant freedom of  humans 
might appeal to numerous passages that explicitly describe human choice. 
For example, in Deut 30:19, God proclaims, “I have set before you life and 
death, the blessing and the curse. So choose life in order that you may live.”5 
Likewise, Joshua stated, “choose for yourselves today whom you will serve” 
whether YHWH or the false gods of  Canaan (Josh 24:15; cf. 1 Kgs 18:21). 
Accordingly, God proclaims judgment against his people because they “chose 
[rxb] that in which” God “did not delight [#px]” (Is 65:12; cf. Ps 78:22).
Further, Scripture repeatedly points to the conditionality involved in the 
God-human relationship. For instance, in Deut 11:26–28, God states, “I am 
setting before you today a blessing and a curse: the blessing if  you listen to 
the commandments of  the LORD your God . . . and the curse, if  you do not 
listen” (cf. 2 Chron 15:2; Jer 18:7-10). Likewise, in Rom 10:9, Paul states, “if  
you confess with your mouth Jesus as Lord, and believe in your heart that 
God raised Him from the dead, you will be saved” (cf. Acts 16:31; Heb 3:8, 
12). Accordingly, Christ states, “I stand at the door and knock; if  anyone 
hears My voice and opens the door, I will come in to him and will dine with 
him, and he with Me” (Rev 3:20; cf. John 1:12; 3:16-18; 8:31-32). 
In my view, the verses above and many others do refer to the freedom 
of  human agents to will otherwise than they do. However, the compatibilist 
responds to these passages by claiming that human freedom does not exclude 
determinism, and does so by defining freedom as merely the absence of  
external compulsion, not the freedom to choose otherwise than one does. 
That is, human free will and divine determinism are compatible if  free will 
means that one’s will is not externally compelled but is nevertheless determined 
by the unilaterally efficacious divine will. Compatibilists frequently appeal to 
passages such as Gen 50:20, where Joseph states of  his brothers’ evil in selling 
him into slavery, “you meant evil against me, but God meant it for good 
in order to bring about this present result, to preserve many people alive.” 
Likewise, compatibilists point to Phil 2:12-13, which states, “work out your 
salvation with fear and trembling; for it is God who is at work in you, both to 
will and to work for His good pleasure.” In these texts (and others like them), 
the compatibilist claims that the free will of  humans (secondary causation) 
acts in subordination to God’s overarching determinism (primary causation). 
Conversely, the indeterminist maintains that these texts (and others like them) 
do not support compatibilism but merely assert that God’s providential 
actions, which do not preclude the libertarian freedom of  humans, can 
bring good out of  evil (Gen 50:20) and work out the salvation of  those who 
respond positively to his free gift (Phil 2:12-13).6
5Biblical citations are from the NASB unless otherwise noted.
6Indeed, the compatibilist perspective on Gen 50:20 raises the question as to 
why God doesn’t just directly overrule the famine. Why take the circuitous route of  
determining that Joseph be sold into slavery to meet the problem of  the famine when 
God could simply remove the famine unilaterally? It appears that some other factor 
or factors were operative.
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This brings the debate between the compatibilist and the advocate of  
significant freedom to an apparent impasse. Both claim that their arguments 
are based on Scriptural passages that negate the perspective of  the other. 
However, it seems to me that the discussion might remain on the basis of  a 
canonical approach to theological method and yet be advanced by approaching 
the issue from a theocentric perspective.7 That is, rather than focusing on 
human freedom qua human freedom, the discussion might be advanced by 
focusing on the logically prior question, is God’s will always efficacious? That 
is, does God always get what he wants?8
God Does Not Always Get What He Wants
An abundance of  biblical evidence suggests that God does not always get 
what he wants. That is, there are some things that God wills that do not 
come to fruition. Scripture displays a number of  instances where God’s will 
is unfulfilled because creatures reject or resist that which God desires.9 For 
instance, Isaiah speaks of  God’s desire to save his people, saying that he 
“longs [hkx] to be gracious” to them and “waits on high to have compassion,” 
but they were “not willing” (hba; Isa 30:15, 18).10 Likewise, God “called, but 
no one answer[ed],” and he “spoke, but they did not listen. And they did 
evil in [his] sight and chose that in which [he] did not delight” (Isa 66:4; cf. 
65:12; Jer 19:5). In these instances, God desires to redeem his people but they 
themselves reject his will for them. The rejection of  God’s will by humans 
is also explicit in Luke 7:30, which states that “the Pharisees and the lawyers 
rejected God’s purpose [boulh,] for themselves” (cf. Mark 7:24).11 Further, 
7The canonical approach I have in mind here gives methodological priority to the 
canonical data. See John C. Peckham, “The Analogy of  Scripture Revisited: A Final 
Form Canonical Approach to Systematic Theology,” Mid-America Journal of  Theology 
22 (2011), 41-53.
8Here and throughout the article, to “want” refers to the desire or wish for some 
outcome (without connoting need), and that which God wants (or desires) is defined 
as that which God would bring about if  he were to unilaterally and causally determine 
the outcome.
9Of  course, a full discussion of  the divine will is far beyond the scope of  this essay. 
For further information on the canonical data regarding the divine will, particularly 
with regard to divine unfulfilled desires and human freedom, see the extensive survey 
in John C. Peckham, The Concept of  Divine Love in the Context of  the God-World Relationship 
(New York: Peter Lang), forthcoming. See also the discussion in John C. Peckham, 
“Providence and God’s Unfulfilled Desires,” Philosophia Christi 15/2 (2013), 453-462.
10That God “waits” (hkx) on the people suggests that God makes his action(s) 
dependent upon contingencies.
11As Joseph Fitzmyer comments, “the Pharisees and lawyers thwarted God’s 
design on their behalf.” Luke I-IX, vol. 28 (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1981). 670. 
Cf. Joel B. Green, The Gospel of  Luke, NICNT (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1997), 
301; Darrell L. Bock, Luke 1:1-9:50, BECNT (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker, 1994), 678. H. 
J. Ritz adds that this assumes “that the βουλη of  God can be hindered.” “boulh,” in 
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Jesus frequently refers to those who do “the will” [qe,lhma] of  the Father 
with the implication that God’s will is not always done (Matt 7:21; 12:50; 
18:14; Mark 3:35; John 6:40; cf. Matt 6:10; John 7:17; 9:31).12
Various Christological examples parallel the wider examples of  God’s 
unfulfilled desires.13 For example, Jesus’s will is explicitly thwarted or rejected 
when Jesus wanted (qe,lw) no one to know of  his location but “he could 
not escape notice” (Mark 7:24; cf. Luke 12:49).14 Further, Jesus poignantly 
laments, “Jerusalem, Jerusalem, who kills the prophets and stones those who 
are sent to her! How often I wanted [qe,lw] to gather your children together, 
the way a hen gathers her chicks under her wings, and you were unwilling 
[qe,lw]” (Matt 23:37; cf. Luke 13:34; John 5:40).15 Notice that, by the same 
verb (qe,lw), Christ’s will is directly opposed by the will of  humans.
In many other instances, God’s will is unfulfilled. God does not desire 
or have “pleasure” [#px] in the death of  the wicked but desires repentance 
(Ezek 18:23, 32; 33:11). However, many reject him.16 Therefore, God’s will 
Exegetical Dictionary of  the New Testament, ed. Horst Robert Balz and Gerhard Schneider 
(Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1990), 224. Piper, however, claims that “themselves” does 
not modify “God’s purpose” but modifies “rejected” such that “Luke would be saying 
that the plan of  salvation preached by John the Baptist was accepted by some and 
rejected by others ‘for themselves.’” Piper, “Are There Two Wills in God?” 119, no. 
26. However, this interpretation is not convincing.
12See R. T. France, The Gospel of  Matthew, NICNT (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 
2007), 246. Cf. John Nolland, The Gospel of  Matthew, NIGTC (Grand Rapids, MI: 
Eerdmans, 2005), 288. Cf. Matt 21:31; Luke 12:47; 1 John 3:22. Marshall comments, 
“It is as we freely yield ourselves to God that he is able to accomplish his will through 
us and our prayers. In a very real sense, therefore, the accomplishment of  God’s will 
in the world does depend on our prayers.” I. Howard Marshall, The Epistles of  John, 
NICNT (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1978), 245.
13The relevance of  such instances from the life of  Christ to the present study 
depends upon the Christological perspective that one takes regarding the nature of  
the will of  the person of  Christ, an adequate treatment of  which is far beyond the 
scope of  this essay. Suffice it to say here that I consider the texts referenced here to 
be relevant examples on the affirmation of  the full divinity and full humanity of  the 
single person of  Christ, on the basis of  which I resist the tendency to assign particular 
actions of  Christ to either his divine or human nature. Yet, those who question whether 
these might be properly taken as examples of  the divine will might nevertheless see 
them as (minimally) relevant in that they parallel the earlier and later examples of  
divine unfulfilled desires.
14See Robert H. Stein, Luke, NAC (Nashville: Broadman & Holman, 2001), 364. 
Cf. C.F.D. Moule, An Idiom Book of  New Testament Greek, 2nd ed. (Cambridge, United 
Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 1959), 137, 87; I. Howard Marshall, The Gospel 
of  Luke, NIGTC (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1978), 546.
15Human wills explicitly rejected the will of  Jesus. See France, The Gospel of  
Matthew, 883; Nolland, The Gospel of  Matthew, 951.
16Although God has no pleasure in anyone’s death, “Yahweh will not impose his 
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is not unilaterally efficacious; some factor or factors bring about states of  
affairs contrary to God’s will that cause him grief  and bring him to judgment, 
though he “does not afflict willingly” (Lam 3:33; cf. 2 Chron 36:16). Indeed, 
God is profoundly troubled at the thought of  bringing judgment against his 
people. Thus, he declares over his wayward people, “How can I give you up, 
O Ephraim? How can I surrender you, O Israel? How can I make you like 
Admah? How can I treat you like Zeboiim? My heart is turned over within 
Me, All My compassions are kindled” (Hos 11:8). However, finally God gives 
people over to their own choices (cf. Rom 1:24). God states that he called his 
people, “but My people did not listen to My voice, And Israel did not obey 
Me. So I gave them over to the stubbornness of  their heart to walk in their 
own devices. Oh that My people would listen to Me, that Israel would walk 
in My ways! I would quickly subdue their enemies and turn My hand against 
their adversaries” (Ps 81:11-14). If  God unilaterally determines the wills of  
all creatures, how can one make sense of  such statements? Why would God 
lament and long for his people to “listen” to him when he is the one who has 
unilaterally determined that they would not listen to him?
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, numerous biblical texts assert 
God’s desire that every person be saved. For example, God “desires [qe,lw] 
all men to be saved” (1 Tim 2:4).17 Yet, the NT elsewhere demonstrates that 
the divine desire that all be saved is not actualized (cf. 1 John 2:17; Heb 10:36). 
Likewise, God “is patient [makroqume,w] . . . not wishing [bou,lomai] for 
any to perish but for all to come to repentance” (2 Pet 3:9). However, not all 
repent (cf. Rev 2:21; 9:20-21; 16:9, 11) and divine patience itself  presumes the 
possibility of  unfulfilled desire (cf. 2 Pet 3:15). It is sometimes argued that the 
terms anyone and all in such passages may be referring to all kinds of  people 
rather than every single individual or that such terms may simply be referring 
to the specific addressees of  the letter.18 However, such interpretations seem 
strained, especially in light of  other texts that do not leave room for that kind 
of  interpretation, such as Ezek 18:32, where God states, “I have no pleasure 
in the death of  anyone who dies. . . . Therefore, repent and live” (emphasis 
grace on a rebellious people. They must accept responsibility for both the course of  
their lives and their destiny. Without repentance God cannot forgive and the death 
sentence remains inevitable.” Daniel I. Block, The Book of  Ezekiel: Chapters 1–24 
(NICOT; Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1997), 589.
17Anton Vögtle contends that this verse excludes the Calvinist/Determinist 
perspective. Der Judasbrief, der 2. Petrusbrief, EKK (Düsseldorf: Benziger Verlag, 1994), 
231-232. Cf. D. Müller, “qelw,” NIDNTT 3: 1020. Further, a number of  exhortations 
to prove, understand, and do the will of  God imply that humans may will  otherwise 
than they do (Rom 12:2; Eph 5:17; Eph 6:6; cf. Col 1:9; 4:12; 1 Thess 4:3; 5:18; cf. 
Phlm 14). While such exhortations are not positive examples of  God’s unfulfilled will, 
such exhortations would be superfluous if  God’s will were always carried out.
18Cf. Richard J. Bauckham, 2 Peter, Jude, WBC (Dallas: Word, 2002), 313; Douglas 
J. Moo, 2 Peter and Jude, NIV application commentary (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 
1996), 188.
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mine).19 God does indeed desire the salvation of  every individual, yet some 
are lost.
The biblical data thus demonstrate that God’s will is sometimes 
unfulfilled. The question, then, is why God’s desires sometimes go unfulfilled. 
That is, why does God sometimes not get what he wants? As explained below, 
an appeal to compatibilism does not adequately explain these texts, because if  
God unilaterally determines all events, he should be able to bring to fruition 
everything that he desires without anything that he does not desire. The 
existence of  unfulfilled divine desires does not make sense from a determinist 
perspective but is perfectly coherent from an indeterminist perspective.
God’s Ideal and Effective Wills
Because God is omnipotent, that some of  his desires do not come to pass 
suggests a distinction between two kinds of  divine wills: ideal and effective.20 
God’s ideal will refers to that which would take place if  all agents acted in 
perfect accordance with God’s desires, whereas God’s effective will refers to 
God’s will that has already taken into account all factors, including the wills 
19Many indeterminist interpreters agree. Thus, Davids states that God wants 
“‘everyone’/‘all’ to come to repentance. . . . God’s will may not be done, but it will not 
be for lack of  trying on his part.” Peter H. Davids, The Letters of  2 Peter and Jude, PNTC 
(Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2006), 281. Similarly, Eric Fuchs and Pierre Reymond 
believe this text argues against determinism. La deuxième Épitre de Saint Pierre. L’épitre de 
Saint Jude, Commentaire du Nouveau Testament (Neuchâtel, Switzerland: Delachaux 
& Niestlé, 1980), 115-116. Likewise, some of  the foremost determinist interpreters 
believe 1 Tim 2:4 and others describe God’s genuine desire for the salvation of  all. See 
Piper, “Are There Two Wills in God?” 108; Thomas R. Schreiner, 1, 2 Peter, Jude, NAC 
(Nashville: Broadman & Holman, 2007), 382.
20Many others have also recognized some distinction in the will or wills of  God. 
For example, I. Howard Marshall states, “We must certainly distinguish between what 
God would like to see happen and what he actually does will to happen, and both of  
these things can be spoken of  as God’s will.” I. Howard Marshall, “Universal Grace 
and Atonement in the Pastoral Epistles,” in The Grace of  God, the Will of  Man: A Case 
for Arminianism, ed. Clark H. Pinnock (Minneapolis, MN: Bethany House, 1995), 56. 
Consider also Kenneth Keathley’s summary of  the four primary positions on God’s 
will, specifically as it relates to God’s desire to save all or the lack thereof. Two major 
perspectives—universalism and decretal theology—view God’s will as simple. The 
former view contends that God desires to save all and does so, whereas the latter 
contends that God desires to save only some. The other two major perspectives—
the hidden/revealed wills paradigm and the antecedent/consequent wills paradigm— 
view God’s will as complex. The former is represented by Schreiner and Piper in this 
essay, whereas my view corresponds more closely to the latter paradigm. Kenneth 
Keathley, Salvation and Sovereignty: A Molinist Approach  (Nashville, TN: B&H Academic, 
2010), 44-62.
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of  significantly free creatures.21 As such, it includes not only the active divine 
will but also that which God merely allows (his permissive will). 
For example, although God’s ideal desire was that Adam and Eve 
not disobey him and eat the forbidden fruit, God also desired the kind of  
reciprocal divine-human love relationship that is predicated on the significant 
freedom of  both parties. Therefore, God permitted Adam and Eve to depart 
from his ideal will in favor of  allowing significant freedom. To take another 
example, God did not sadistically delight in, or ideally desire, the crucifixion 
of  Christ (cf. Lam 3:32–33). Rather, it was his “pleasure” only in the wider 
context of  the plan of  salvation. That is, because of  his love for his creatures, 
and because the death of  his Son was the means of  their redemption, God 
was “pleased to crush Him” (cf. Isa 53:10). Ideally, however, there would have 
never been sin and thus no occasion for such suffering and sacrifice. As such, 
when God is said to pleasure in things that are themselves distasteful to him, 
God’s pleasure is in the wider result rather than the things themselves (cf. Isa 
53:10; Matt 11:25–26; Luke 10:21).22 In this manner, such passages do not 
contradict the clear meaning of  passages that state that God has no pleasure 
in the death of  anyone (cf. Ezek. 18:23, 32; 33:11).
This distinction between that which God ideally desires (ideal will) 
and that which often actually takes place (effective will) is supported by the 
primary word groups of  God’s will in both the OT (#px) and NT (qe,lw 
and bou,lomai). In some instances these terms refer to God’s unfulfilled will 
21In other words, it is that which God wills in accordance with the wider matrix 
of  creaturely freedom. This distinction is similar to the Arminian distinction between 
antecedent and consequent wills. I have elected not to use these terms, to avoid any 
unintended connotations of  ontology, especially with regard to the operation of  the 
divine will as it relates to providence (specifically the theoretical order of  the divine 
decrees). For a discussion of  Arminius’ view of  the antecedent and consequent wills 
of  God and their implications for divine sovereignty, see Roger E. Olson, Arminian 
Theology: Myths and Realities  (Downers Grove, IL: IVP Academic, 2006), 23. See also 
Alvin Plantinga’s distinction between strong and weak actualization in his argument for 
the significant freedom of  creatures and divine omnipotence and omnibenevolence. 
Plantinga, The Nature of  Necessity, 172-173. Cf. Peckham, “Providence and God’s 
Unfulfilled Desires.”
22God’s permissive will (as a subset of  God’s effective will) thus may function 
in accordance with wide principles of  the extent of  freedom afforded to creaturely 
agents. However, it is well beyond the scope of  this work to delve more deeply into 
this issue of  divine providence. Consider, for a brief  overview of  these issues of  
divine providence, Fernando Canale, “Doctrine of  God,” in Handbook of  Seventh-day 
Adventist Theology, ed. Raoul Dederen (Hagerstown, MD: Review and Herald, 2000), 
118-120; Thomas P. Flint, “Divine Providence,” in The Oxford Handbook of  Philosophical 
Theology, ed. Thomas P. Flint and Michael C. Rea (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2008), 262-285. Cf. Francesca Aran Murphy and Philip Gordon Ziegler, eds., Providence 
of  God (New York: T&T Clark, 2009); Dennis Jowers, ed. Four Views on Divine Providence 
(Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 2011); Peckham, “Providence and God’s Unfulfilled 
Desires.”
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and/or desires (Ezek 18:23, 32; 33:11; Isa 65:12; 66:4; Prov 21:3; Matt 22:37; 
Mark 7:24; Luke 7:30; 1 Tim 2:4; 2 Pet 3:9), whereas elsewhere the terms 
may refer to God’s effective will rather than his ideal will (cf. Isa 46:10; 53:10; 
Acts 2:23; 1 Cor 4:19; James 4:15).23 Thus, whereas theologians continue to 
debate the operation of  the divine will, the biblical data demonstrate that 
there is nothing inherent in the terminology of  will that requires or suggests 
unilateral efficaciousness.24 In fact, as seen above, the biblical data show that, 
since many things occur that God does not want to occur, the divine will 
may be unfulfilled. The distinction between God’s ideal and effective wills, 
then, corresponds to the data of  Scripture and provides a compelling and 
internally coherent explanation for the texts that depict God’s unfulfilled 
wishes, especially regarding God’s actual desire to save everyone, which does 
not come to fruition despite God’s genuine efforts (e.g., Isa 5:1-7).
The Determinist Conception of  God’s Two Wills
If  God does not always get what he wants, it appears that one must reject 
determinism. However, some determinists have proposed a nuanced 
explanation that deserves careful consideration. John Piper and Tom 
Schreiner—two of  the most influential determinist thinkers today—both 
agree that texts such as 1 Tim 2:4 (God “desires [qe,lw] all men to be saved”) 
23In the OT, the term #px may refer to God’s desire and/or will, at times fulfilled 
and at times unfulfilled, but also may denote God’s delight and/or pleasure. See 
G. Johannes Botterweck, “#px” TDOT 13:92; Leon J. Wood, “#px” TLOT 1:310; 
David Talley, “#px,” NIDOTTE 2:232. In the NT, the qe,lw word group relates to 
that which is willed, desired, wanted, taken pleasure in, or even liked. See Müller, 
NIDNTT 3:1018; M. Limbeck, “qelw” in Exegetical Dictionary of  the New Testament, 
ed. Horst Robert Balz and Gerhard Schneider (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1990), 
138; “qe,lw” in Greek-English Lexicon of  the New Testament Based on Semantic Domains, ed. 
Johannes P. Louw and Eugene Albert Nida (New York: United Bible Societies, 1996), 
287, 300. The βουλομαι word group similarly relates to that which is wanted, desired, 
willed, intended, and/or planned, whether of  volition or inclination, often with the 
connotation of  deliberation. See D. Müller, “boulomai,” NIDNTT 3: 1015-1017; 
Gottlob Schrenk, “boulomai, boulh, boulhma,” in TDNT, ed. Gerhard Kittel, 
Geoffrey William Bromiley, and Gerhard Friedrich (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 
1964), 632. Even rxb, the primary term of  election in the OT, may refer to God’s 
unfulfilled desire (Prov 21:3 cf. Isa 58:5-6; Matt 9:13; Heb 10:5, 8; 13:21). See the 
extended discussion of  these various terms and the import of  their canonical usage in 
Peckham, The Concept of  Divine Love in the Context of  the God-World Relationship.
24I. Howard Marshall thus correctly comments that assuming that God’s will is 
always done in “deterministic terms is inconsistent with the freedom which the Bible 
itself  assigns to God’s children.” Marshall, The Epistles of  John, 245. This is contra the 
sometimes misleading statements regarding these terms such as the contention that the 
use of  the boulomai word-group “is always a case of  an irrefragable determination.” 
Müller, NIDNTT 3:1017. Cf. Gottlob Schrenk, “qelw, qelhma, qelhsij,” in TDNT, 
ed. Gerhard Kittel, Geoffrey William Bromiley, and Gerhard Friedrich (Grand Rapids, 
Mich, MI: Eerdmans, 1964), 3:47. Cf. Luke 7:30.
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refer to God’s genuine desire that all will be saved, while both nevertheless 
maintain the idea of  double predestination.25 To coherently maintain God’s 
genuine desire that all be saved and double predestination, both Piper 
and Schreiner recognize a distinction between two divine wills. Schreiner 
distinguishes between God’s “decretive will” and his “desired will,” such that 
“God genuinely desires in one sense that all will be saved” and yet “he has 
not ultimately decreed that all will be saved.”26 As Piper puts it, “God chooses 
for behavior to come about that he commands not to happen” such that 
God’s desires are “complex” and one may distinguish between God’s “will of  
command” and his “will of  decree.”27 
Piper points to a number of  examples to support the complexity of  
the divine will. For instance, he claims that in the Exodus account, “there 
is a sense in which God does will that Pharaoh go on refusing to let the 
people go” (will of  decree) and “there is a sense in which he does will that 
25As Thomas Schreiner (himself  a determinist) puts it, “By extension we should 
understand 2 Pet 3:9 in the same way as Ezek 18:32. It refers to God’s desire that 
everyone without exception be saved.” Schreiner, 1, 2 Peter, Jude, 382. He adds that, 
in Ezek 18:32, “God’s regret over the perishing of  anyone is clear.” Ibid., 381. Piper 
notes that it is possible that 1 Tim 2:4 does not refer to God’s desire to save all but 
personally believes that it is the most likely interpretation, especially in light of  Ezek 
18:23, 18:32, and 33:11, and thus states that “as a hearty believer in unconditional, 
individual election I rejoice to affirm that God does not delight in the perishing of  
the impenitent, and that he has compassion on all people. My aim is to show that 
this is not double talk.” Piper, “Are There Two Wills in God?” 108. He further states, 
“I affirm with John 3:16 and 1 Timothy 2:4 that God loves the world with a deep 
compassion and desires the salvation of  all men. Yet I also affirm that God has chosen 
from the foundation of  the world whom he will save from sin” (ibid., 130). However, 
Piper contends of  1 Tim 2:4, “When free will is found in this verse, it is philosophical, 
metaphysical assumption, not an exegetical conclusion” (ibid., 124).
26Schreiner, 1, 2 Peter, Jude, 381-382. Elsewhere, he states, “God desires the 
salvation of  all in one sense, but he does not ultimately ordain that all will be saved.” 
Ibid., 381. In his view, “the Scriptures, if  accepted as a harmonious whole, compel 
us to make such distinctions.” Ibid., 382. This solution complements the traditional 
Reformed distinction between God’s hidden and revealed wills, but with considerable 
nuance. See John Calvin, Commentaries on the Catholic Epistles (Grand Rapids, MI: 
Eerdmans, 1948), 419-420; Martin Luther, The Bondage of  the Will, trans. O.R. Johnston 
(Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Books, 2003), 101. See also, in this regard, Paul Kjoss 
Helseth’s treatment in “God Causes All Things,” in Four Views on Divine Providence, ed. 
Dennis Jowers (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 2011), 25-52, 165-169.
27Piper, “Are There Two Wills in God?” 114, 118. As Piper describes, “When 
God looks at a painful or wicked event through his narrow lens, he sees the tragedy 
or the sin for what it is in itself  and he is angered and grieved” (ibid., 126). Cf. Ezek 
18:32. “But when God looks at a painful or wicked event through his wide-angle lens, 
he sees the tragedy or the sin in relation to all the connections and effect that form a 
pattern or mosaic stretching into eternity. This mosaic, with all its (good and evil) parts 
he does delight in (Ps. 115:3)” (ibid).
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Pharaoh release his people” as he commands (will of  command).28 Likewise, 
Piper explains that while Judas’s betrayal of  Jesus was “inspired immediately 
by Satan (Luke 22:3)” the Bible also declares that “Jesus [was] delivered up 
according to the definite plan (boule) and foreknowledge of  God” (Acts 
2:23).29 For Piper, this is the “most compelling example of  God’s willing for 
sin to come to pass while at the same time disapproving the sin.”30 Yet, Piper 
explains, “in ordering all things, including sinful acts, God is not sinning,” 
because “God can will that a sinful act come to pass without willing it as 
an act of  sin himself.”31 Finally, Piper contrasts God’s “desire” (#px) to kill 
Eli’s sons (1 Sam 2:25; cf. Deut 28:63) with the statements that God takes 
no pleasure in (#px) the death of  the wicked (Ezek 18:23, 32; 33:11).32 Thus, 
“in one sense God may desire the death of  the wicked and in another sense 
he may not.”33 Thus, both Piper and Schreiner agree that God’s desires are 
complex and some do not come to fruition, especially with regard to his 
desire to save all. However, all of  this evokes the question, Why would God’s 
will be complex?34
28Ibid., 114. As Piper puts it, “The good thing that God commands he prevents. 
And the thing he brings about involves sin” (ibid). Significantly, however, according to 
the ordering of  the texts in Exodus, Pharaoh hardened his own heart (Exod 8:15, 32) 
before God hardened it. Piper, to his credit, recognizes that the text does not explicitly 
say that God hardened Pharaoh’s heart until the sixth plague (Exod 9:12; 10:20, 27; 
11:10; 14:4). However, he contends that even if  “God was not willing for Pharaoh’s 
heart to be hardened during the first five plagues . . . for the last five plagues God 
does will this” and that God’s action in this regard amounts to his willing of  Pharaoh’s 
self-proclaimed “sin” (Exod 10:17). Ibid. Cf. Deut 2:26-27, 30; Josh 11:19-20; Rom 
11:25-26, 31-32.
29Likewise, Piper points to examples in Mark where Christ wills that sinners “turn 
and be forgiven (Mark 1:15), but he acts in a way to restrict the fulfillment of  that 
will” by speaking in parables such that they may see but not perceive and hear but not 
understand (cf. Mark 4:11-12). Ibid., 115. Further, he contends, God “wills a condition 
(hardness of  heart)” in Rom 11:25-26 “that he commands people to strive against 
(‘Do not harden your heart’ [Heb 3:8, 15; 4:7]).” Ibid., 116.
30Ibid., 111.
31Ibid., 122-123. Cf. Jas 1:13.
32In fact, he emphasizes that God is said to act the way he does “because” of  his 
desire to put them to death. Ibid., 117.
33Ibid. He claims that again “we are faced with the inescapable biblical fact that 
in some sense God does not delight in the death of  the wicked (Ezek 18), and in 
some sense he does (Deut 28:63; 2 Sam 2:25).” Ibid., 118-119. On the other hand, the 
question is not whether God finally desired the death of  Eli’s sons but why he desired 
it. From an indeterminist perspective, God’s “desire” to put Eli’s sons to death was a 
result of  their freely willed and persistent wickedness.
34It is important to note that each of  the examples that Piper surveys in his 
arguments in favor of  his conception of  two wills (above) can be accounted for by the 
distinction between God’s ideal and effective wills.
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Why Are God’s Desires Sometimes Unfulfilled?
As Piper puts it, “what are we to say of  the fact that God wills something 
that in fact does not happen?”35 For instance, if  God is omnipotent and 
God wants everyone to be saved, as Piper and I agree that he is and does, 
why isn’t everyone saved?36 In the determinist views of  Piper and Schreiner 
(among others), God in some sense desires that all be saved but nevertheless 
decrees, solely on the basis of  his unilaterally efficacious will, that some will 
be damned. However, this raises an impenetrable difficulty: if  God’s will is 
unilaterally efficacious and God wants to save everyone, why does he not do 
so? As Jerry Walls states, “If  freedom and determinism are compatible, God 
could have created a world in which all persons freely did only the good at all 
times.”37 If—as the compatibilist view presumes—God unilaterally effects his 
will, then God should determine “all to freely accept his love and be saved.”38
Piper answers that “God wills not to save all, even though he is willing 
to save all, because there is something else that he wills more, which would be 
lost if  he exerted his sovereign power to save all.”39 That is, “God is committed 
to something even more valuable than saving all,” a “higher commitment.”40 
Thus, “God’s will to save all people is restrained by his commitment to the 
glorification of  his sovereign grace (Eph 1:6, 12, 14; Rom 9:22-23).”41 I 
agree with Piper’s appeal to God’s higher commitment. However, the crucial 
question is what that higher commitment is.
35Piper, “Are There Two Wills in God?” 123.
36The omnipotence of  God rules out the view that some power greater than God 
is overruling what he wills: “Neither Calvinist nor Arminian affirms this.” Ibid.
37Jerry L. Walls, “Why No Classical Theist, Let Alone Orthodox Christian, 
Should Ever Be a Compatibilist,” Philosophia Christi 13, no. 1 (2011): 82.
38Ibid., 96. “To put the point most bluntly, if  compatibilism is true, it is all 
but impossible, in the actual world, to maintain the perfect goodness of  God, and 
altogether impossible to do so if  orthodox Christianity is true.” Ibid., 80. Walls and 
David Baggett contend that the compatibilistic account relies on euphemistic and 
evasive language, stating “it’s only the elect who can actually receive salvation, so no 
offer of  salvation to the non-elect is a genuine offer. . . . To describe such an empty 
offer as a genuine one is worse than euphemistic.” See the discussion in Good God: 
The Theistic Foundations of  Morality  (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 72. Cf. 
the discussion in ibid., 67-73. David Bentley Hart adds, in this regard, that “freedom 
lies not in an action’s logical conditions, but in the action itself; and if  an action is 
causally necessitated or infallibly predetermined, its indeterminacy with regard to its 
proximate cause in no way makes it free.” “Impassibility as Transcendence: On the 
Infinite Innocence of  God,” in Divine Impassibility and the Mystery of  Human Suffering, ed. 
James Keating and Thomas Joseph White (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2009), 309.
39Piper, “Are There Two Wills in God?” 123.
40Ibid., 124, 130.
41Ibid., 130.
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In my view, God’s highest value is love, which is itself  essential to his 
character and requires justice.42 Since freedom is a prerequisite of  love, God 
cannot unilaterally determine that creatures love him or one another.43 Thus, 
though he never desires evil to occur, God allows humans the freedom to 
choose evil, including the human decision to reject salvation, because to 
exclude freedom would be to exclude love, which would run counter to God’s 
own character, since “God is love” (1 John 4:8, 16).44 Notice that, in this view, 
God’s higher commitment to love is one that he cannot bring about without 
allowing freedom and, thus, the possibility of  evil. God, in accordance with 
his universal love, wanted to save those who are finally lost but they are not 
willing (cf. Isa 66:4; Ezek 3:7; Matt 23:37; Luke 13:34).
For Piper’s Calvinistic determinism, on the other hand, “the greater value 
is the manifestation of  the full range of  God’s glory in wrath and mercy (Rom 
9:22-23) and the humbling of  man so that he enjoys giving all credit to God for 
his salvation (1 Cor 1:29).”45 However, according to the logical conclusions of  
Piper’s determinism, couldn’t God accomplish this without the possibility, or 
reality, of  evil? Could not God simply determine that all creatures recognize 
his glory to the utmost? If  God unilaterally determines everything, as Piper 
and others suppose, then he could have willed the recognition “of  the full 
range” of  his glory and grace immediately.
One wonders, in this regard, why God would want to manifest his “glory 
in wrath,” especially when the Bible contends that he does not afflict willingly 
nor desire that any perish (Lam 3:32-33; Ezek 18:32; 33:11; 2 Pet 3:9). Further, 
I see no rationale, from a determinist perspective, for viewing God’s will as 
42I categorically reject the way Piper frames the indeterminist view of  this 
higher commitment. He states, “The answer given by Arminians is that human self-
determination and the possible resulting love relationship with God are more valuable 
than saving all people by sovereign, efficacious grace.” Ibid., 124. I am not concerned 
about “human self-determination” in and of  itself, but I do care about the character 
of  God as described by Scripture, and the significant freedom of  humans provides the 
key to understanding God’s character in light of  the questions of  theodicy.
43Many theologians, like Vincent Brümmer, believe that “love is necessarily free.” 
The Model of  Love: A Study in Philosophical Theology  (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1993), 177. Likewise numerous exegetes contend that “coerced love is not love.” 
See James D. G. Dunn, Romans 1–8 (Dallas: Word, 2002), 481. Thus, “God never 
imposes His love by overriding human will.” Craig Blomberg, Matthew (Nashville: 
Broadman & Holman, 2001), 350. Of  course, many question whether “love” actually 
requires freedom since the nature of  love is itself  debated. This question far exceeds 
the scope of  this essay. See, in this regard, Peckham, The Concept of  Divine Love in the 
Context of  the God-World Relationship.
44Accordingly, the “fact that all are not saved can be attributed to the stubbornness 
of  the human will rather than to the weakness of  the divine intent.” Thomas D. Lea 
and Hayne P. Griffin, Jr., 1, 2 Timothy, Titus (NAC 34; Nashville: Broadman & Holman, 
2001), 89. So Jerry L. Walls and Joseph Dongell, Why I Am Not a Calvinist; idem, “Why 
No Classical Theist,” 98.
45Piper, “Are There Two Wills in God?” 124.
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“restrained.” It seems to me that in Piper’s view there should be no such 
restraint. God could bring it about that all recognize the fullness of  his glory 
without demonstrating it historically, since, for Piper, God can unilaterally 
determine anything and no one can question his will. 
Indeed, Piper’s view fails to account for why a sovereign God would 
have complex desires at all, whereas the significant-freedom perspective 
faces no difficulty in this regard. The problem with Piper’s view does not lie 
with the concept of  God’s commitment to a higher purpose, which results 
in complex desires. I agree that God “wills” some things that he does not 
ideally desire because of  a greater purpose that he desires more (without ever 
actually wanting any evil to occur). However, Piper’s view falters because it 
maintains that God’s higher commitment requires all of  the suffering and evil 
in the world. Taking Piper’s view to its logical conclusion, it appears that God 
willed and unilaterally determined all evil and suffering, even the sexual abuse 
of  children and the burning alive of  infants to pagan gods, along with every 
other single event of  evil, because God wanted to demonstrate his glory, grace, 
and wrath.46 Although God did not want children to suffer such abuse, he 
wanted to demonstrate his glory, grace, and wrath more. However, why would 
such things bring glory to God in the first place, even indirectly?47 
In this regard, Thomas McCall presents an analogy wherein a father who 
is able to fully control every desire and act of  his seven children, commands 
them not to play with matches, yet determines that they do so and thereby 
set their playroom ablaze. He then bursts into the room and carries three of  
them to safety. When asked why he does not also save the other four, the 
father replies that “this tragic occurrence had been determined by him” and 
“worked out in exact accordance with his plan.” He further reminds them that 
he had told them not to play with matches and thus the other four get what 
they deserve. He claims that he has compassion on their siblings but that “this 
has happened so that everyone could see how smart he is” and “how merciful 
he is” and “how just he is.” McCall concludes, “Surely the fact that such a man 
is a monster is beyond dispute.”48
46See Thomas McCall’s criticism of  Piper in this regard that, on determinism, 
every evil (such as a father’s murder of  his 5-year old daughter) happens because “God 
determines that they will occur exactly as they do.” “I Believe in Divine Sovereignty,” 
Trinity Journal 29NS (2008): 209. On the other hand, Piper should be commended for 
his pastoral concern in stating by way of  response that “if  my affirmation that God 
wills that sin come to pass . . . or that God wills that people die of  starvation (Jer 
11:22), requires of  someone that they believe in their hearts that God sins or that God 
is evil, then I say to them, ‘Do not yet believe what I say. Your conscience forbids 
it.’” John Piper, “I Believe in God’s Self-Sufficiency: A Response to Thomas McCall,” 
Trinity Journal 29NS (2008): 234.
47McCall further asks where the supposition that God must display his glory 
comes from. It is not “demanded by any passage of  Scripture.” “I Believe in Divine 
Sovereignty,” 223.
48Thomas H. McCall, “We Believe in Divine Sovereignty: A Rejoinder to John 
Piper,” Trinity Journal 29NS(2008): 241-242. As William Lane Craig comments, “the 
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Even if  such a powerful analogy can be effectively answered, Piper’s 
account faces further difficulty. Specifically, if  God unilaterally determined 
everything, he would not need evil things to occur to bring him glory in 
the first place. He could will the full recognition of  his glory immediately. 
Moreover, even if  one could provide a rationale for why a God who unilaterally 
determines everything could not efficaciously will the full manifestation of  his 
glory immediately, if  God needed to will evil to arrive at the manifestation of  
his glory, then we must say that God needed all of  the evil that has occurred 
in order to glorify his goodness. As David Bentley Hart puts it, “If  God 
needs the supplement of  evil to accomplish any good he intends” then “he is 
dependent upon evil in an absolute sense.”49  This presents a massive problem 
for the moral character of  God and appears to contradict the deterministic 
understanding of  God’s sovereign, efficacious will.50
The free-will defense, on the other hand, agrees that God’s overarching 
desire for the universal harmony of  all beings in loving relationship trumps 
his desire, in the short-term, to exclude all suffering and evil. However, this 
deterministic view holds that even the movement of  the human will is caused by God. 
God moves people to choose evil, and they cannot do otherwise. God determines 
their choices and makes them do wrong. If  it is evil to make another person do wrong, 
then in this view God not only is the cause of  sin and evil, but he becomes evil 
himself, which is absurd.” William Lane Craig, “Response to Helseth,” in Four Views 
on Divine Providence, ed. Dennis Jowers (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 2011), 61. 
Moreover, “[i]t is deeply insulting to God to think that he would create beings that 
are in every respect causally determined by him and then treat them as though they 
were free agents, punishing them for the wrong actions he made them do or loving 
them as though they were freely responding agents.” Ibid., 62. Cf. Jerry L. Walls, “Why 
No Classical Theist,” 98; Stephen T. Davis, “Universalism, Hell, and the Fate of  the 
Ignorant,” Modern Theology 6/2 (1990): 190.
49“Providence and Causality: On Divine Innocence,” in Providence of  God, ed. 
Francesca Murphy and Philip Ziegler (New York: T&T Clark, 2009), 49. See also 
McCall’s similar criticism in “I Believe in Divine Sovereignty,” 216-219. McCall argues 
that if  evil is necessary for God’s maximal glory, then God “would be imperfect without 
such evil,” and this “pretty clearly violates robust accounts of  both divine holiness and 
divine aseity” and, taken to its logical conclusions, makes God’s existent contingent 
upon the actualization of  this world. Ibid., 219-220. Further, Piper’s account leaves 
one “wondering just why we should see sin and suffering as finally reprehensible.” If  
evil is “that important for God” and his maximal glory, then “why should we detest 
sin, death, and the devil?” Ibid., 217. See Piper’s response wherein he affirms divine 
aseity, saying that “God was fully God with no deficiencies before he created the 
world” and qualifies his earlier statements to say that God’s “‘maximal glorification’ is 
essential to God” only “as he is acting in creation” such that “it does not contradict 
God’s aseity to say that in the act of  creation and redemption and judgment it is God’s 
nature and glory and name to act freely in the display of  grace and wrath.” Piper, “I 
Believe in God’s Self-Sufficiency,” 229-230. Cf. Walter Schultz, “Jonathan Edwards’s 
End of  Creation: An Exposition and Defense,” JETS 49/2 (2006): 269.
50On the moral goodness of  God, see Baggett and Walls, Good God.
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perspective claims that this is the case only because there is no other way to 
bring about his overarching purpose, and no other way exists precisely because 
his overarching purpose of  love requires significant creaturely freedom.51 
That is, God could not have brought his ultimate purpose to fruition without 
at least the possibility of  such suffering and evil, because doing so would 
have required eliminating significant creaturely freedom, which would itself  
remove the possibility of  genuine love that was the higher commitment in 
the first place.52 However, the free-will defense does not require that any evil 
and suffering actually take place in order to bring about God’s purpose. That 
is, evil did not need to occur but occurred only because creatures exercised 
their freedom negatively. It would have been better had Satan never fallen, 
had Adam and Eve never sinned. Although God did not need evil to arise in 
order to manifest his character, God is manifesting his character of  perfect 
love in dealing with evil once and for all, so that sin will never arise again and 
his ultimate purpose of  eternal, universal harmony of  love will ultimately 
come to fruition. 
In all this, God calls for creatures to “judge” between himself  and his 
people: What more could God have done that he has not done? (Isa 5:3-
4). The indeterminist perspective answers unequivocally that God has 
done everything he could. He did not desire evil and he does not desire the 
destruction of  anyone. This brings us back to perhaps the most crucial point 
regarding the validity of  divine determinism: that God’s desires are not always 
fulfilled is apparent in that God has no pleasure in the death of  the wicked 
(cf. Ezek 18:23, 32; 33:11) and desires that none would perish (2 Pet 3:9; cf. 
1 Tim 2:4–6). However, not all people will be saved, because God eventually 
gives people over to their desires (cf. John 3:18; Rom 1:24, 26, 28; 2:4–12; 
1 John 2:17).53 While God truly desires the salvation of  each individual and 
works toward saving each one, some are lost because they reject God’s gift of  
salvation through Jesus Christ (cf. John 3:18).
In contrast, the determinist view lacks a compelling answer to the 
question, If  God possesses the power to save everyone and wants to save 
everyone, why does he not do so?54 Indeed, why is there any evil at all? The 
51As Gregory Boyd puts it, “God gave us the capacity freely to reject his loving 
will because it was necessary for love” (emphasis his). “God Limits His Control,” in Four 
Views on Divine Providence, ed. Dennis Jowers (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 2011), 
190. Cf. Brümmer, The Model of  Love, 177.
52As William Lane Craig puts it, “It is logically impossible to make someone freely 
do something.” “The Coherence of  Theism: Introduction,” in Philosophy of  Religion: 
A Reader and Guide, ed. William Lane Craig (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University 
Press, 2002), 211. 
53For a compelling biblical argument against universalism, see I. Howard Marshall, 
“The New Testament Does Not Teach Universal Salvation,” in Universal Salvation? 
The Current Debate, ed. Robin Parry and Christopher Partridge (Grand Rapids, MI: 
Eerdmans, 2003), 55-76.
54If, as Calvinists say, God deems it wise and good to elect unconditionally some 
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appeal to God’s two wills fails to answer these questions, because it raises 
another question; that is, why would a God who unilaterally determines 
everything have two conflicting wills? That is, a God whose will does not take 
into account the wills of  others should not have complex desires because he 
could unilaterally will that only good occur, never evil. As such, the existence 
of  unfulfilled divine desires throughout Scripture does not make sense from 
a determinist perspective but is perfectly coherent within an indeterminist 
perspective, based on the understanding of  significant creaturely freedom.
Conclusion and Implications for the Free-Will Defense
In addressing the issue of  whether a free-will defense can be adequately 
supported by a biblical doctrine of  significant creaturely freedom, two central 
theocentric questions have been addressed. First, does God always get what 
he wants? As seen above, the biblical data demonstrate that God’s will is 
sometimes unfulfilled, which answers this question in the affirmative but 
raises a second, equally important question, Why are God’s desires sometimes 
unfulfilled? This article has demonstrated that determinism does not provide 
an adequate response to these questions. The appeal to compatibilism does 
not explain the biblical instances of  God’s unfulfilled desires, since, if  God 
unilaterally determines all events, he possesses the ability to bring to fruition 
only that which he desires. The appeal to God’s complex desires as a way to 
address this issue does not suffice, because there appears to be no sufficient, 
internally coherent reason for complex divine desires within a deterministic 
worldview. From the standpoint of  determinism, God ought to be able to 
bring about his higher commitment and will only the good, never evil. 
Determinism thus fails to provide an adequate explanation of  the 
numerous biblical texts that directly assert that God’s will is sometimes 
unfulfilled. The determinist appeal to God’s two wills fails because it lacks a 
compelling and coherent rationale for why God would have complex desires. 
In the indeterminist view, on the other hand, the complexity of  God’s will 
arises because God has granted humans significant freedom that impacts the 
course of  history such that God’s ideal will may be unfulfilled and has done 
so because love, which requires such freedom, would be excluded otherwise. 
The indeterminist can thus present a coherent and biblically adequate 
explanation of  God’s unfulfilled desires, affirming that God never desires 
evil, while maintaining the final triumph of  God’s plan that will ultimately 
bring everlasting harmony to the universe.
In all this, the biblical data regarding God’s unfulfilled desires point to the 
authenticity of  significant human freedom, which itself  undergirds the free-
will defense. God never does evil or desires evil of  any kind but has allowed 
creatures to have significant freedom because of  his love. God’s preservation 
of  love exacted the highest price from God himself  (John 3:16; 15:13). Christ 
to salvation and not others, one may legitimately ask whether the offer of  salvation 
to all is genuine. Is it made with heart? Does it come from real compassion? Is the 
willing that none perish a bona fide willing of  love?” Piper, “Are There Two Wills in 
God?” 127.
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willingly took the sins of  the world on himself  and, in doing so, has preserved 
both his justice and his love (cf. Rom 3:23-26; Rom 5:8). To God alone be the 
glory (soli deo gloria), because God is love!
